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Progress may be made in resolving the tension between free will and deter-
minism by analysis of the necessary conditions of freedom. It is of the essence 
that these conditions include causal and deterministic regularities. Further-
more, the human expression of free will is informed by understanding some 
of those regularities, and increments in that understanding have served to 
enhance freedom. When the possible character of a deterministic system based 
on physical theory is considered, it is judged that, far from implying the eli-
mination of human freedom, such a theory might simply set parameters for 
it; indeed knowledge of that system could again prove to be in some respects 
liberating. On the other hand, it is of the essence that the overarching biolog-
ical framework is not a deterministic system and it foregrounds the beha-
vioural flexibility of humans in being able to choose within a range of options 
and react to chance occurrences. Furthermore, an issue for determinism flows 
from the way in which randomness (e.g. using a true random number gene-
rator) and chance events could and do enter human life. Once the implica-
tions of that issue are fully understood, other elements fit comfortably to-
gether in our understanding of freely undertaken action: the contribution of 
reasons and causes; the fact that reasons are never sufficient to account for 
outcomes; the rationale for the attribution of praise and blame. 
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1. Introduction 
There are widely recognised problems focused on the idea of free will. People 
generally understand themselves to be making choices and exercising responsi-
bility. This perspective may then be confronted with the notion that the universe 
is a deterministic system, which is taken to mean that its condition at any time is 
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controlled by its condition at an earlier time, and so on backwards in an indefi-
nitely extended way (Hoefer, 2016). The notion of “control” within a determi-
nistic system is taken to mean that, given the laws of nature, later states neces-
sarily follow from earlier states (Blackburn, 2009). 
It is easily felt that the two ideas of freedom and a deterministic system are in 
tension, even to the point of incompatibility (Britannica, 2021). The notion of 
freedom implies we are taking decisions and choosing between alternatives; it is 
of the essence that we could act in ways different from how we do in fact act. 
Against this, the deterministic system model has us necessarily controlled by 
earlier events which could stretch back even before we were born. Are we free if 
our choices and actions are in principle determinable in advance?  
In the attempt to make progress in overcoming the problem, it is not infre-
quently asserted that there are elements of randomness in the system; at least in 
some respects, it may be claimed that what happens involves indeterminacy. To 
sharpen the point recourse is most often had to quantum theory. Within that 
body of ideas, random events are posited at a subatomic level, although it is un-
clear whether this gives rise to randomness at the aggregate level of ma-
cro-events and objects. Nevertheless, quantum theory is now believed to be in-
volved in the understanding of life processes such as metamorphosis in the but-
terfly and the behaviour of the robin (Al-Khalili & McFadden, 2015). It seems 
possible that it may also be needed to understand processes internal to the hu-
man brain. So the notion that the character of quantum theory (within which 
probability is an essential element) has implications for human thought and ac-
tion cannot remotely be ruled out. However, the positing of pure indeterminacy 
may in itself be no more helpful to the idea of free will than is determinacy. This 
is because nothing can determine the outcome of a system governed by pure in-
determinacy; therefore that outcome cannot be said to be the responsibility of a 
human agent exercising free will.  
At this point in discussion, another suggestion which sometimes arises is that 
the human agent makes decisions and choices while being independent of phys-
ical nature: from that vantage point, he or she can somehow intervene and make 
things happen. However, this is not a defensible position. In respect of physical 
nature, forces and events arise from earlier forces and events. One only has to 
reflect on the fact that chemical and electrical changes in the brain underlie 
thought, speech and action; they are necessary conditions for those events. Hu-
mans have arisen within physical nature and in their actions, they cannot tran-
scend physical laws, as illustrated by our bodies and motion being subject to the 
law of gravitation. 
Hence there is a marked tendency for this relatively familiar line of thought to 
reach an impasse. To orient further, it is worth noting that the idea of acting 
freely or acting on the basis of free will is to be understood as primarily lay ter-
minology; it is not a specialist philosophical idea nor a term of art, though, of 
course, philosophers and others contribute to the understanding of it. On the 
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cialist and esoteric and has few links to the average life. Some difficulties in 
bringing these two ideas together in philosophical discussion flow from differ-
ences in their origins and contexts. Nevertheless, the intention of this article is to 
make progress from the impasse by placing each concept in context and teasing 
out the nexus between them. An initial purpose is to survey the context of the 
use of the idea of freedom in life and to proceed to argue that causality and de-
terminism figure as conditions for human freedom rather than simply being 
constraints upon it. There follows an examination of how randomness and 
chance events may enter human life. Various considerations imply that the exer-
cise of human freedom is such that the idea of the universe as a deterministic 
system incorporating human action is a mistaken one. 
2. The Meaning of Freedom 
A primary meaning of freedom concerns (decisive or overwhelming) physical 
constraint: in a locked cell a prisoner is not free to leave, while he or she is free to 
leave a cell when the door is open. We also judge that an individual is not free 
when their behaviour is a response to post-hypnotic suggestion; in this case, they 
are judged not to be the source (or, in a sense, author) of their own behaviour. In 
these types of cases, an individual is judged free to do something or to refrain 
from doing something only when they are able to do so; the latter condition may 
be unstated but, if so, it is implied. It may, for instance, be judged that a drug 
addict cannot straightforwardly stop taking a drug, or that an extreme agora-
phobic cannot bring themselves to enter an open space. These latter are cases 
where there is no external physical constraint but there is understood to be a de-
cisive internal one.  
It is worth pointing up that in these straightforward cases the determination 
of human behaviour is only in a specified “broad brush” sense. Thus when we 
say the prisoner is not free to leave the cell, this says nothing about their beha-
viour within the cell: he or she might take a seat or, alternatively, pace up and 
down. Again, the agoraphobic would have a wide range of behavioural options 
not involving entering a particular open space. It is indeed very difficult, proba-
bly impossible even as a thought experiment to construct a scenario where the 
determination of behaviour is as exact and minute as that implied by the notion 
of a deterministic system.  
In the interests of completeness, one must note a further, perhaps secondary 
use of freedom which arises in cases where behaviour is subject to regulation but 
is not understood to be determined, even in a partial sense, by external or inter-
nal constraint. These are cases where behaviour is understood to be regulated 
because it falls within the scope of rules or the authority of another; for instance, 
school rules dictate that we are not free to walk on the grass or behaviour is sub-
ject to “doctor’s orders”. In these cases the constraint is real but its impact is 
mediated through the intentionality of those subject to it; they are fully recog-
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where sanctions may be brought to bear, but the constrained individual is still 
understood to retain freedom of action, although in practice is less likely to act 
in a specified way. 
In ordinary, everyday situations how are judgements as to freedom made? 
They are generally made taking account of the types of factors already indicated. 
Hence, when it is inquired whether someone is free, it might be asked whether 
he or she is able to do something and whether they are subject to external or in-
ternal constraint; also whether rules might be broken or it would involve defying 
authority. We fully understand there are situations where someone could do 
something but it would be hard for them to do so. Arising out of these consider-
ations, it seems that freedom may be approached as a kind of residual, meaning 
that the freedom to do something is what an individual has in the absence of the 
above types of constraints and limitations. In particular, many writers concur 
with Hobbes in understanding liberty as the absence of impediments “not con-
tained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent” (Hobbes, 1999; Ayer, 
1954). As indicated earlier, a basic related idea is that, in the given context, the 
individual has alternative ways of acting. In being free to do something one is 
also free not to do it or free to do something else: it is basic that one could be-
have otherwise (O’Connor & Franklin, 2021).  
Further to Hobbes’s reference to “the nature of the agent”, a further point may 
be made by way of clarification. It applies when an assertion is made of the kind 
that an individual is “law-abiding”, or “has democratic values” or “appreciates 
art”, i.e. when attention is being directed at someone’s values. The mistaken 
claim is then sometimes made that this person’s freedom or exercise of free will 
is somehow constrained or compromised by their needing to conform to their 
own values. On the contrary, however, the essence of free will lies in one’s ac-
tions expressing one’s values and preferences, and not in contravening them. A 
law-abiding person will intend to fill in his or her income tax return truthfully; 
someone with democratic values will choose to vote in an election; someone who 
appreciates art will occasionally visit the National Gallery. Indeed, unless you 
exhibit these types of behaviour patterns you cannot be said to hold the corres-
ponding values. The restrictions of freedom would be real were the individual 
prevented from acting in these kinds of ways. In sum, acting on the basis of free 
will involves expressing one’s values and preferences; the latter cannot properly 
be said to compromise or subtract from that freedom.  
3. Conditions of Freedom 
To make progress on the central issue it is worth dwelling on a suggestive insight 
of Hume. He went so far as to argue that determinism is a necessary condition 
for freedom—or at least, he argued that some causality principle along the lines 
of “same cause, same effect” is required (Hoefer, 2016). Hume’s pertinent con-
tribution can help us to take a new direction in our deliberations on free will and 
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dependent upon the operation of causality and deterministic phenomena. For 
instance, for it to be said that you are free to lift an apple to your mouth, it must 
be the case that apples remain of roughly the same weight and do not suddenly 
become a thousand times heavier; similarly, your arm will not suddenly detach 
at the elbow. Again, communication between people is conditional upon sound 
(air pressure) waves or electromagnetic waves continuing to exhibit law-governed 
regularities. Importantly, this does not amount to saying that free will depends 
upon the operation of a fully deterministic system; nevertheless, in the absence 
of the types of conditions indicated by Hume, freely undertaken human action 
would become impossible because of a lack of predictability in the relation be-
tween intention and outcome.  
One can usefully add to that, however, by saying that the human exercise of 
free will is itself informed by an understanding of causality and deterministic 
phenomena. Let’s note some pertinent examples: 1) We draw back from the top 
of a cliff face because we fear falling over it (under gravity) and being killed; 2) 
We pull up at a pedestrian crossing conscious that the momentum of a car could 
easily kill or injure a pedestrian; 3) We replace a failed light bulb with another of 
the same type in the expectation that a lamp will then work. In each case the ex-
pectation we have is well-founded but the key point is that our exercise of free 
will is informed by that expectation. This line of thought does indeed represent a 
considerable change of direction in treating the main topic for this reason: in-
itially, the idea of a deterministic system was being used to suggest that our ac-
tions were on (albeit complicated) tramlines meaning that apparent options 
were in reality unavailable. Now the entirely different vista opens up that the ex-
ercise of free will essentially involves a choice between options which is in-
formed by an understanding of causal and some deterministic phenomena.  
Whether gravity is a deterministic phenomenon is still a subject for debate 
(Hoefer, 2016; Earman, 1986); at the risk of oversimplifying, the argument here 
travels with the view that it is. A consideration of that phenomenon can illu-
strate not simply that human action is subject to a deterministic system, but the 
understanding of the operation of that system can add dimensions to human 
freedom: can indeed be liberating. The first thing to say is that a human being is 
indeed governed by gravity all the time; for instance every step one takes is go-
verned by the need to preserve balance; when eating and drinking one ensures 
the food and drink do not fall to the floor as opposed to reaching the mouth. 
Gravity is indeed constraining: most obviously, we cannot fly by waving our 
arms. The various behavioural options open to us must be ones where there is 
conformity to the law of gravity; freedom is subject to gravity. But here is the 
clever bit: the development of human civilization has been marked by an in-
crease in the range of options associated with advances in the understanding of 
mechanical processes constrained by gravity, such as in the use of the inclined 
plane, the lever and the pulley; also the ability to transport heavy craft and 
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energy within a hydro-electric facility. Most spectacularly humans have mas-
tered heavier-than-air flight. This last is spectacular precisely because the way in 
which the pull of gravity on the airplane is balanced by an air-pressure uplift is 
so subtle. (Heavier than air flight was judged to be impossible by some scientists 
even in the nineteenth century.) These are collective achievements which liberate 
us as individuals. The picture is now of a deterministic system which contributes 
to our liberation; we are not simply constrained by gravity but we make use of it. 
For these purposes, the hallmark of a deterministic system is that you can rely on 
it both from moment to moment and long-term. 
4. The Nature of Overarching Scientific Theory 
It is worth stepping back at this point and inquiring what a deterministic system 
of the type initially indicated above could possibly look like. Referring to physi-
cal science there are understood to be four basic forces, gravity, the electromag-
netic force, the nuclear strong force and the nuclear weak force; there is also a 
standard model of particle physics. There is talk of “a theory of everything” but 
that would involve the integration of theory, e.g. the theory of gravity together 
with theory concerning the other forces; it would not involve jettisoning the un-
derstanding provided by each element. In addition, physical theory interprets 
phenomena within the context of quantum theory and general relativity. It is 
hard to envisage any overarching deterministic system which does not have 
these sorts of constituent elements (although the incorporation of quantum 
theory would make probability an essential ingredient) (Eagle, 2021). Why then 
could not the relation of that integrated deterministic theory with human free-
dom be the same as that exhibited by gravity alone? In other words, why could 
not human activity be governed by that system all the time but in a way which 
merely defines parameters of human freedom, and what is more, could not 
knowledge of the operation of that system be liberating in the way which applies 
to gravity alone?  
Additional illustration of the point can indeed be provided by consideration of 
the electromagnetic force. Everything in our environment and in our bodies 
conforms to the laws of electrical attraction and repulsion. Nevertheless, that 
merely defines parameters of human freedom. The ubiquity and importance of 
electricity in the universe are substantially concealed from us because most but 
not all of our natural everyday environment is in fact electrically neutral. Where, 
however, we are aware of the phenomenon, then we may make use of it. Thus, 
we can be killed by lightning strike but through our understanding of electricity, 
we can design a lightning conductor or an electrically powered air-conditioning 
system, both of which are life enhancing, the first through diminishing injury 
and death, the second through enlarging our range of options. 
So far in considering the possible character of a deterministic system attention 
has been directed at basic physical science which is often what people have in 




DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2021.114032 488 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
special sciences such as chemistry and biology. In order to clarify issues of de-
terminism and the parameters of human freedom, these special sciences also 
warrant careful scrutiny. In one respect, the position as regards chemistry seems 
similar to that of physics in that plainly the whole of the human body and its en-
vironment is governed by chemistry, and thus that discipline defines parameters 
of human freedom, but it is again the case that our collective knowledge of che-
mistry is liberating, as is illustrated by its place within the chemical industries. 
However, there is the complexity that chemistry and biology come together in 
biochemistry. 
When it comes to biology and biochemistry there is a crucial distinction to be 
made between the understanding of (a) the anatomy and physiology of the hu-
man body (i.e. the internal working of the human organism so that life may be 
maintained) and (b) the development of the human being as an organism and its 
life process within its environment. Under (a) a key point is that a whole num-
ber of conditions need to be met for the human organism to remain alive and to 
be able to exercise freedom. e.g., there is a need for the blood to circulate, for 
haemoglobin to bind oxygen and transport it to cells; also, for there to be inter-
nal temperature control. Indeed, there are many systems in operation internal to 
the body which depend upon causal including deterministic processes; particu-
larly important are all the various processes constituting cell biology. Crucially, 
in this connection, the operation of a combination of deterministic chemical and 
electrical processes within the human body is the basis for human movement 
(involving the molecules glucose and ATP) and communication internal to the 
body (involving chemical changes within the cell and changes of electrical po-
tential difference between cells); therefore freely undertaken human action only 
has reality given the operation of those processes. What is also apparent is that 
the human understanding of these biological processes enlarges the scope of 
human freedom; most importantly, there is the understanding of the causes of 
morbidity and mortality, which is put to good use in medicine and surgery.  
It is highly significant, however, that when it comes to (b) the biological un-
derstanding of the development of the human being as an organism and its life 
process, the overarching framework of biology provided by the synthesis of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection and genetics does not amount to a de-
terministic system (Brandon & Carson, 1996), nor is there anything in that set of 
ideas which implies minute determination of human action from moment to 
moment. In fact, the position is entirely the opposite, for the picture which 
emerges is of humans who are provided with large brains so as to be able to ad-
just behaviour strategically and tactically in response to local circumstances; they 
make complex decisions on a moment-by-moment basis (Startup, 2021). The 
complexity of the situations partly arises from the non-human environment but 
also from anticipated and unanticipated interventions of other human agents. 
That picture is altogether compatible with free will, but it does not fit with the 
idea of human behaviour or its context being determined in advance. It is worth 
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overall deterministic system is that it could fully accommodate the interactions 
of human beings themselves.  
5. Some Issues Regarding Determinism 
Arising out of this discussion of the scope of the sciences, there are further con-
siderations which lead one to doubt the possibility of a comprehensive determi-
nistic account of human behaviour. One has to do with the fact that while there 
are physical laws or theories which are arguably deterministic in character, these 
apply to aspects of reality rather than to its comprehensive nature. The theory of 
gravitation with its inverse square law is a case in point. That theory concerns 
such aspects (variables) as force, mass, length and time. (The familiar classical 
form of that theory is subject to reformulation within the general theory of rela-
tivity but that does not essentially change the point being made here.) Gravita-
tional theory enables one to determine the position and velocity of the planet 
Earth at some future time given knowledge of its position and velocity at an ear-
lier time (i.e. assuming the solar system remains an isolable system); it also helps 
to explain why humans cannot fly like birds. Crucially, however, this is only a 
determination in relation to the variables in the theory; it goes no wider than 
that. For instance, the theory enables one to determine the position of the planet 
or of a falling human being but it does not bear in the same way on the life 
process itself—for the simple reason that the parameters of life go beyond force, 
mass, length and time. There is every reason to doubt that any assemblage or in-
tegration of physical theories could provide a deterministic account of human 
behaviour including decision making; for one thing, the categories of physical 
theory have no bearing on those involved in human decision-making nor for 
that matter on rule-following behaviour which is central to human social life. Of 
course, as noted above, theories from the special science of biology, as opposed 
to physical theories, do bear directly on life processes but not in such a way as to 
offer a deterministic account of individual human behaviour. 
Further consideration also points against the adequacy of a longer-term de-
terministic account. In the search for such an account, attention is often drawn 
to processes internal to the body and particularly within the brain. The view is 
often advanced that neuronal activity is interdependent with, or accounts for, 
human thought and behaviour and it is indeed the case that the two relate inti-
mately. This important consideration, however, does not provide the basis for a 
deterministic account. In particular, it does not take sufficient account of the fact 
that humans are continually interacting with the environment and especially 
with other people. Where a conversation is underway the behaviour of any one 
party derives to a critical extent from the contribution of the other person i.e. it 
goes above and beyond the initial state or process of their own brain. Where a 
question is asked of another person and a response provided, there is a range of 
options in respect of the replies and then a range of options in terms of how the 
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cally ask questions where the response is already known; nor can they be sure of 
their own reaction in advance. It is implausible that an adequate deterministic 
account of human behaviour based on neuronal activity could even in principle 
be provided given this feature of virtually continuous interaction with an envi-
ronment, within which other people form the most fundamentally important 
part. Furthermore what is referred to as culture is a complex resultant of these 
kinds of interactions. The notion that culture and cultural change could be ac-
commodated within a proposed deterministic account is particularly far-fetched. 
Occasionally in this connection, the notion that there could be theoretical reduc-
tionism is postulated. (An example of reductionism within the sciences concerns 
interpreting the phenomenon of temperature by reference to the kinetic theory 
of gases.) In this instance, however, the gulf between the concepts employed in 
respect of the two spheres appears to be altogether too great.  
6. Randomness and Chance Interventions in Human Life 
As already pointed out, the valuable behavioural flexibility that humans exhibit 
is partly concerned with addressing unexpected developments in the human and 
non-human environment. In this section, the intention is to argue that the idea 
of a deterministic system may be seen to break down at precisely that point i.e. 
when one directs sustained attention to the notion of truly random or chance 
elements entering into or impinging upon the course of human life. 
Within the context of philosophical discussion of free will and determinism, 
the suggestion may arise that the appearance of alternatives in human life is de-
ceptive, that actual behaviour at a point in time is determined from its antece-
dents. Against this, a common way for a proponent of free will to seek to dem-
onstrate the real existence of alternatives is to exhibit them successively. Thus 
the assertion may be made that one could choose to sit in any one of a row of 
seats and the demonstration consists of sitting in each one successively and 
moving between them. It is significant that that demonstration would normally 
be taken as decisive and definitive in showing that one could occupy any seat 
and the seats in any order. Nevertheless, the determinist may still seek to counter 
with the suggestion that the order in which the seats are occupied is determined 
or predetermined. That response is felt to be implausible but it seems to call for 
greater attention to the phenomenon of the exercise of choice between alterna-
tives presented at the same time. 
In that connection an interesting and challenging case may be constructed: 
this is where an individual is presented with alternatives but decides to act on 
that which is chosen at random. One could enter a room where there are six 
empty seats but decide which one to occupy at random; again, one could decide 
which of six possible holidays to take at random and then precede to embark on 
the holiday selected. For this purpose use would be made of a true random 
number generator (TRNG) based on random physical sources; the phenomenon 
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Making choices in this way is perfectly compatible with the idea of free will— 
the agent can patently adopt this strategy, but is it compatible with a determinis-
tic account directed at human behaviour? It would be possible for a persistent 
determinist to claim that the decision to choose a random strategy was determined 
or predetermined, but this will not do in relation to the outcome and conse-
quences of the choice. It may also be asserted that once the alternative has been 
selected randomly, that determines the subsequent course of action (assuming 
there is no change of mind). However, it does not seem that there could be pre-
cise determination of human behaviour across the specific time when the ran-
dom selection is made i.e. there can be no exact determination of behaviour 
linking the position a short or longer interval of time before the selection is 
made to the position afterwards. Patently too the specific choice made could 
have substantial long-term consequences as when new friends are made on a 
holiday. One may be selecting from divergent life courses. 
So far the case has been considered where an individual makes choices for 
himself or herself using TRNG. However, it is also highly significant that that 
type of randomness may be introduced into the lives of an indefinitely large 
number of other people. This is because, given that we are continually interact-
ing with others, one could choose to allow the timing or content of those inte-
ractions to be governed to varying degrees by TRNG. Thus, one could offer to 
buy one’s wife a present but decide randomly at what point in the day to raise it 
with her. Again, one could choose randomly either to offer the present or to of-
fer to take her out for a meal. Furthermore, one could randomly select individu-
als from one’s address book, in order to ring them up to ask them how they are. 
Hence genuine randomness may enter into an agent’s own strategy, or it may be 
introduced into the circumstances of action of others (even without them know-
ing). It may also be judged that those subject to chance inputs could also subse-
quently inter-affect one another, thereby contributing massive complexity. This 
consideration of the introduction of randomness serves to undermine the idea 
that the behaviour of any of the people concerned could in principle be sub-
sumed within a longer-term deterministic account. 
It is worth stressing that no suggestion is being made that the pattern of beha-
viour of the individuals involved undergoes any gross change across the time 
when the particular random selection is made. Hence their character, personali-
ty, values and knowledge may properly be said to persist; in sum, their behaviour 
would continue to exhibit familiar tendencies throughout the period: for in-
stance, they continue to be a shy person, interested in rugby union and suppor-
tive of a particular political party. Based on this, all manner of fairly safe predic-
tions could be made about their behaviour. So the point of the example is not to 
establish that you cannot predict human behaviour with a measure of success; 
no, the point of the example is to establish that in a particular instance precise 
determination may not be possible across an interval of time.  
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introduced into the situations described earlier. For instance, the prisoner in a 
cell with an unlocked door may randomly decide to leave the cell immediately or 
after five minutes. Someone presented with a lawn and a notice saying they must 
not walk on it could decide at random whether to do so. Patently any situation 
where we consider an individual free could have this element introduced into 
decision making. 
Now it is a very familiar feature of life that all manner of “chance events” oc-
cur in it, although none may be governed by a strict TRNG. One may decide 
something on the toss of a coin, the throw of a dice, the turn of a roulette wheel 
or through participation in a lottery; an individual may even attempt to choose 
between alternatives “at random” without any external aid. In a contrived way, it 
may be claimed that any one of these is “deterministic” at the deepest level e.g. 
that if you know the angle, initial impulse and other information relating to a 
coin toss the outcome may be predicted. However, what is deeply implausible is 
that this opens the way to a “before and after” deterministic account in a way 
that a strict TRNG does not. Thus it is unconvincing to say in the aforemen-
tioned cases that deciding which seat or holiday to select on the throw of a dice 
as opposed to using a TRNG would make any essential difference. For one thing, 
these other methods may be so refined as to come indefinitely close to TRNG, so 
considerations of continuity suggest that their use would have the same implica-
tions. Hence it seems sound to conclude that the many chance aspects to life 
cannot be accommodated within an overall deterministic account. In point of 
fact, a major problem for such an account is that the number of what we under-
stand to be chance events that could conceivably impinge on any specified con-
text of human action at any time is indefinitely huge and it is unclear even in 
principle how a deterministic account could comprehensively accommodate the 
totality of them.  
It is worth emphasizing that chance enters into life to a considerable extent 
and perhaps rather more than is commonly realised. Thus I get up intending to 
go for a walk but it may or may not be raining; half way through my walk I may 
or may not find I am rubbing a blister; further on, I encounter and engage in 
conversation with a friend who recounts an incident I find mildly depressing. 
Indeed chance may, as shown above, enter into the process of human deci-
sion-making, or, alternatively, it may enter into the conditions or context of 
human decision making. It is not too much to claim that chance events are im-
pinging on our lives all the time, many being minor but others being major in 
their implications for the course of life. Hence the evident failure of determinis-
tic accounts in principle to handle chance elements shaping behaviour is of ma-
jor significance. 
7. The Motivation for Action: The Centrality of Reasons 
Let us next look more carefully at how precisely humans choose between options 
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the main patterns of motivation of action, one notes a paramount need for hu-
mans to define and achieve goals to sustain their pattern of life through extended 
time. The form this takes is acting on the basis of reasons. Reasons may be facts 
about the situation we are in or objectives that we hope to achieve. Thus when 
asked why one is leaving a building, the response may be that it is on fire. When 
asked why one is going into work the reply may be that it leads to one receiving 
a wage or salary which sustains one’s standard of living. Often the considerations 
which enter in are relatively complex—there can be factors pulling us this way 
and that and actual behaviour bears witness to their relative importance. Hence 
someone can say they would much rather watch television than go into work but 
they have decided to go in on the basis of longer-term consequences. Complexity 
also derives from the fact that reasons arise out of people’s interests and values 
but are also shaped by emotional considerations, desires and aversions. In sum, 
reasons enable humans to negotiate their way through the range of options that 
are presented in extended time. 
So in accounting for what people do, the identification of their reasons for ac-
tion is of primary importance. However, importantly, as John Searle says, rea-
sons are never sufficient to account for the performance of the action. In one in-
fluential account, he puts his position in this way: “The sense of freedom in vo-
luntary action is a sense that the causes of the action, though effective and real in 
the form of the reasons for the action, are insufficient to determine the action 
will occur” (Searle, 2001). A consideration which suggests he is right is that 
however many reasons there are for doing something, one can typically imagine 
some further factor entering before completion which prevents it from happen-
ing. Thus a nurse who is just leaving home to go to the cinema may alter his or 
her behaviour on learning that a next door neighbour has just had a heart attack 
and is urgently in need of help. In the terms used earlier, the occurrence and 
precise timing of the neighbour’s heart attack is a chance event impinging on the 
nurse’s life. It may also be added that that particular potential disruptor of the 
cinema trip could itself be further overtaken by the discovery that emergency 
para-medical staff have already arrived next door, thus enabling the planned trip 
to go ahead. This on-off pattern is by no means uncommon in life. Evidently, 
there is necessary flexibility in human behaviour which enables them to express 
the priority of particular values. This last is exemplified by the actions of the 
nurse, who exhibits flexibility in the expression of professional values. 
8. Reasons and Causes 
It may be recalled that in the suggestive Hume quotation given earlier there was 
reference both to determinism and causality. Although an extended determinis-
tic account of human decision-making fails, it is not the case that the notion of 
cause lacks application in that sphere, far from it. Indeed it may be possible to 
provide a relatively full account of human action in causal terms, even though it 
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to make behaviour more likely without determining it (Anscombe, 1971). Since 
we have just said the hallmark of acting freely is acting on the basis of reasons, 
this raises the issue of the relationship between explanation by reference to rea-
sons and that by reference to causes; also the specific point regarding whether 
reasons can be causes (Smith, 1998; Laitinen et al., 2013). In point of fact, in 
everyday English the meanings of the words “reason” and “cause” overlap, but 
the intention here is to identify a specific difference. That difference has to do 
with the fact that the reason a person gives for an action is close to being a justi-
fication of it, while a cause is not in itself a justification. A causal account may 
also probe the wider context. 
To illuminate matters, one may develop a little the example introduced earlier 
concerning the nurse who was interrupted on his or her way to the cinema. 
Suppose what happened, in outline, was this. The nurse had read for the first 
time in the Sunday newspaper that someone had made a film of the life of Flo-
rence Nightingale; he or she was very intrigued having long-term interest in the 
work and life of that well-known figure; on the following Monday the nurse rang 
round the main cinema chains and happily found that the film was shortly to be 
shown locally; a couple of weeks later he or she was about to proceed to the ci-
nema to see the film.  
It may be judged at once that one or more chance factors comes into this sto-
ry, most obviously, it is an essential feature that the nurse becomes aware of the 
existence of the film in the first place. The nurse might have failed to read the 
review and missed the film altogether; conceivably they could have heard about 
it from some other source before it was too late. As we already know the cinema 
trip was interrupted by the neighbour’s heart attack. 
The example illustrates that one makes sense of freely undertaken activity by 
focusing on reasons, purposes and motivation. In considering a causal account 
as opposed to one in terms of reasons, it is worth dwelling on the point that the 
nurse became aware of the film by reading a review in the Sunday newspaper. 
We would commonly say this gave the nurse a reason for wishing to go to the 
cinema to see the film, but how could it not figure also in a causal account? How 
could an individual be motivated to see a specific film locally without first hav-
ing heard that the film had been made and was being shown locally? Plainly they 
could not. So there is good reason to believe reasons (in this case that the film is 
available to be seen locally) may also be causes. But can there be causes which 
are not reasons, at least in the sense that they would not be cited as such by the 
person concerned? There can, as is illustrated by the way the cinema trip was in-
terrupted. It is open to an investigator to establish that the prior socialisation of 
the nurse had been particularly intense, so that he or she would always tend to 
respond directly to health emergencies whether in or out of uniform. So that 
could be postulated as a causal factor; it situates behaviour by providing a wider 
context. It would not, however, be cited by the nurse as a reason for interrupting 




DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2021.114032 495 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
be causes but there are also causes which would not be cited as reasons by the 
person concerned. It is typically cited reasons which may be offered in justifica-
tion.  
9. Praise and Blame 
The position established so far fits well with the ways we attribute praise and 
blame. Were it the case that the extended deterministic account of human beha-
viour and decision-making held true we would be reacting to people who are 
prisoners of events. Contrastingly, given that in the main people are properly 
understood as acting freely and on the basis of reasons, these types of contribu-
tions and interventions make sense (Wallace, 1994; Talbert, 2019). Very impor-
tantly, humans anticipate the future and rehearse outcomes. It follows that 
where someone has reasons to act badly, for example against the law, the under-
standing of possible future punishment gives them a reason to do otherwise. 
More generally the attribution of praise and blame, and the anticipation that this 
might be forthcoming, channel behaviour in desired ways. The attribution of 
praise and blame is a rational corollary of the understanding that people are 
generally acting freely and on the basis of reasons. 
It is also highly relevant that we realise that sometimes people are unable to do 
the right thing or would have difficulty doing so. The notion of diminished re-
sponsibility acknowledges this. Our responses to others are frequently nuanced. 
For instance, we recognise that someone heavily under the influence of alcohol 
may act irresponsibly because of their condition, but we do not excuse it when 
we judge that they freely embarked upon a drinking spree. It is indeed evident 
that our changing and developing understanding of factors affecting freedom of 
action feeds into a civilising process; for instance, we recognise as illnesses con-
ditions previously thought to arise from moral defectiveness. So the pattern in-
dicated earlier whereby our developing scientific knowledge shapes our freely 
chosen behaviour applies here. Despite this, across the vast sweep of behaviour, 
we quite properly understand ourselves and others as responsible and acting on 
the basis of reasons. In that context, possible attribution of praise and blame fig-
ures among the reasons for our actions. 
10. Conclusion 
To make progress in understanding the relation between free will and determin-
ism, it proves to be valuable to analyse the conditions of freedom. Not only is the 
human exercise of free will necessarily dependent upon the operation of causali-
ty and of deterministic phenomena, but it is also itself informed by the under-
standing of these conditions of freedom; indeed, as has been illustrated, the pro-
gressively expanded human understanding of phenomena such as gravity and 
electromagnetism has proved liberating.  
A useful next step is to consider the possible character of an overarching de-
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cial sciences. Perhaps surprisingly the conclusion which emerges is that an inte-
grated deterministic account based on physical theory, which is that most often 
cited as a possibility, far from implying the collapse of human freedom to va-
nishing point, might have much the same implications for human freedom as do 
gravity and electromagnetism. In other words, it merely sets certain limitations 
on, or parameters for, human freedom; in a parallel way, knowledge of that in-
tegrated theory could again prove liberating.  
Passing on to the special sciences, there are two key points. One is that freely 
undertaken human action only has reality given the operation of deterministic 
chemical and electrical processes internal to the human body. The second is that 
the overarching biological framework provided by the synthesis of the theory of 
evolution and genetics does not amount to a deterministic system. Far from that 
set of ideas implying minute determination of human behaviour the opposite is 
true: humans are understood to possess the flexibility to choose between alterna-
tives in complex and changing situations; in particular they can react to chance 
interventions in their circumstances. In sum, consideration of the possible cha-
racter of developing integrated scientific theory does not imply prior determina-
tion of human action. This conclusion tends to be reinforced when considera-
tion is given to the conceptual gulf between the various aspects and units em-
ployed in scientific accounts and those employed in the understanding of human 
action and culture.  
A basic problem for the notion of an all-embracing deterministic system con-
cerns the way randomness and chance do or could enter human life. It is con-
cluded that an essential feature of free will is that the individual could choose 
randomly between defined alternatives or they could be presented with ran-
domly chosen elements in their circumstances of action; but the consequences of 
the outcomes of decisions made in that way cannot be fully accommodated 
within a deterministic account stretching over an extended time. This conclu-
sion was first drawn narrowly by reference to choices specifically made using 
TRNG, but it is judged that considerations of continuity suggest that it applies 
much more widely to the many situations in life where chance factors enter, 
some of which approach the conditions of TRNG indefinitely closely.  
Once the chimera of the universe as a deterministic system recedes, various 
elements can be seen to link up within our picture of the basis of human action. 
In respect of the main pattern of human motivation, humans are understood to 
be acting on the basis of reasons. However, reasons are never sufficient to ac-
count for a particular outcome of the action, the main factor being that chance 
events may impinge or intervene, thereby introducing new reasons and thereby 
changing the outcome. Hence the flexibility in human life which stems from the 
genuine choice between alternatives is to be understood as thereby making the 
action more effective or appropriate. This perspective integrates exactly with the 
overarching biological framework.  
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causes in the explanation of human action. A key point is that reasons may be 
causes but there are also causes which would not be cited as reasons by the per-
son concerned; causes may also probe the wider context. So also is the rationale 
for praise and blame secured, with the possible attribution of praise and blame 
figuring among the reasons for our actions and thereby serving to structure or 
restructure them. In the sphere of social control, just as in other spheres, the 
growth in understanding of factors bearing upon human behaviour, some de-
terministic in their character but others deriving from relevant tendencies, is 
fundamentally liberating.  
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